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of negotiated rates,29 the Gordon and Fredrickson opinions reflect the
basic conflict in most cases involving allegedly monopolistic ex-
change action. 0 Thus the Supreme Court's review of the Gordon
decision3 could indicate whether exchange action other than rate
fixing, which is closely regulated by the SEC, is immune from anti-
trust scrutiny. In comparing the lower courts' resolutions in Gordon
and Fredrickson, the Gordon approach seems the sounder. To apply
the Silver test properly, a court must determine whether "subjecting
[the allegedly monopolistic action] to antitrust attack would frus-
trate the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act. '3 2 The preferable
solution, therefore, would permit SEC evaluation of the antitrust
implications of the exchange rules in a unified examination of the
problem, rather than adopt a case by case approach in the courts with
the substantial possibility of conflicting results.
X. THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION
ACT OF 1970 (SIPA)
During the late 1960's, the securities market was plagued with
growing investor disillusionment as a result of the financial difficul-
ties suffered by broker-dealers.' To bolster investor confidence and to
remove the uncertainty in the securities industry, Congress enacted
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.2 The SIPA provides for
11 The SEC's adoption of Rule 19b-3 makes illegal fixed rate systems after May
1, 1975, except that floor brokerage rates may remain fixed until May 1, 1976. SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975) (Rule 19b-3 reprinted at CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 26,284, Commission's comments reprinted at CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
80,067). For a review of some of the implications of the new rate system, see CALvERT,
From Auction Markets to a Central Market System: A New York Stock Exchange
Perspective, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 295 (1974).
11 Not all antitrust cases involving the securities exchanges involve fixed rate
systems. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (involving
denial of direct wire telephone connections to non-Exchange members). Thus the new
negotiable rate system will not end antitrust problems in the securities exchange field.
31 - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 491 (1974). See also United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1974), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 95 S.
Ct. 37 (1974).
2 Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 270 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
' From 1967 to 1970 the securities industry experienced its most severe crisis since
the stock market crash of 1929. In these four years "many firms failed, and customer
losses exceeded $130 million." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9622, [1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,801, at 81,716 (May 31, 1972).
' 15 U.S.C. §§78o(c)(3), 78aaa-lll (1970) [hereinafter cited as SIPA].
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the orderly liquidation of a failing broker-dealer' and establishes a
limited insurance fund4 to protect investors from the financial failure
of their broker-dealers.5 To administer the fund and to carry out the
provisions of the Act, the SIPA established the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SI:PC), comprised of "members" who are
"persons registered as brokers or dealers,"6 and "all persons who are
members of a national securities exchange."
Under the procedure set out in the SIPA, once the SIPC is noti-
fied' of the "approaching financial difficulty"' of any member firm,
it may'0 request a federal district court to appoint a trustee." The
15 U.S.C. §78fff(a)(4) (1970).
15 U.S.C. §78ddd (1970). This fund was to be established by the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation [hereinafter cited as SIPC], a non-profit organization
which shall "not be an agency or establishment of the United States. Government."
15 U.S.C. §78ccc(a)(1) (1970). The fund is supplied from annual assessments on the
various members of the SIPC (15 U.S.C. §78ccc(a)(2) (1970)) based primarily upon
those gross revenues attributable to the securities business of the member firms. 15
U.S.C. §78ddd(c) (1970).
5 H.R. REP. No. 91-1613, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5254, 5255 (1970). The
motivation for this legislation was similar to that which prompted establishment of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Id.
* 15 U.S.C. §78ccc(a)(2)(A) (1970).
15 U.S.C. §78ccc(a)(2)(B) (1970).
SIPC has a relatively restricted role in that it "is not a federal agency, has no
power to examine or regulate its members, and is subject to intensive SEC supervi-
sion." Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An Early Assessment, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 802, 807 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SIPA Assessment]. The SEC can
veto any bylaw or rule adopted by the SIPC, and can require SIPC to adopt any bylaw
or rule. 15 U.S.C. §78ccc(e)(3) (1970). The SEC also has supervisory control over the
operations of the SIPC. 15 U.S.C. §78ggg(c) (1970).
8 Under the SIPA, the SEC is required to notify the SIPC immediately if financial
difficulties of any SIPC member firm are brought to its attention. 15 U.S.C.
§78eee(a)(1) (1970).
* 15 U.S.C. §78eee(a)(1) (1970). Section 78eee(a)(1) demonstrates the SIPC's reli-
ance on the SEC for identification of failing firms and operation of the program. Under
§78eee(a)(2), however, the SIPC makes the final determination of whether "any mem-
ber firm has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers." 15
U.S.C. §78eee(a)(2) (1970). While the phrase "financial difficulty" is not defined, one
commentator has suggested that it means something less than present or approaching
danger of a member's failing to meet its customer obligations. SIPA Assessment, supra
note 52, at 803. This seems consistent with the legislative purpose of the Act to scruti-
nize closely the activities of member firms in the hope of avoiding financial crisis in
the securities industry. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
" 15 U.S.C. §78eee(a)(2) (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. §78eee(b)(3) (1970). Under this section the SIPC recommends a trus-
tee to the court, and an attorney for such a trustee. The court must accept the SIPC's
1975]
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SIPC trustee is given various powers and duties similar to those of a
trustee in bankruptcy.'2 The statutorily enumerated duties of the
SIPC trustee include:'3 (1) continuing the operation of the debtor's"
business in order to complete any "open contractual commit-
ments;' 5 (2) distributing the "single and separate fund,"'" returning
"specifically identifiable property,"'" and paying customers those
monies which the SIPC has advanced; 8 (3) enforcing any subrogation
rights; and, (4) liquidating completely the business of the member
involved. 9
During a SIPC proceeding, the district court generally assumes
the duties of a bankruptcy court" although the discretion concerning
trustee appointment and supervision which the court would exercise
in a bankruptcy proceeding is modified. 2' The SIPA provides that the
provisions of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act shall apply in any
SIPC proceeding to the extent that the acts are consistent.2 However,
recommendations subject to the condition that they be "disinterested" persons. 15
U.S.C. §78eee(b)(3) (1970). For purposes of the Act a "disinterested" person is defined
by §558 of Title 11 of the United States Code. In deciding the question of disinterest,
the courts have considered two factors: (1) "whether the trustee was employed by a
creditor of the debtor whose claim against the estate is in dispute;" and (2) "the nature
of the proceedings wherein the services of the trustee are to be performed." SEC v.
Schreiber Bosse & Co., 368 F. Supp. 24, 26 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Thus, a law firm which
was the chief outside counsel for one of the creditors of the debtor could not act as
attorney in a SIPC proceeding and none of the firm's attorneys could be trustees. Id.
at 27. If the SIPC fails to apply for the appointment of a trustee in an appropriate case,
the SEC may seek an order from a district court compelling such application. 15
U.S.C. §78ggg(b) (1970).
,2 15 U.S.C. §78fff(b)(1) (1970).
'1 The trustee also has authority to hire and fix the compensation for all personnel
and other persons necessary for the liquidation proceeding. 15 U.S.C. §78fff(b)(1)(A)
(1970).
" 15 U.S.C. §78eee(b)(4)(A) (1970). The "debtor" is the SIPC member being
liquidated because of financial difficulties. Id.
,5 15 U.S.C. §§78fff(b)(1)(B), 78 fff(d) (1970).
,1 The "single and separate fund" consists of all property held by the debtor for
customers, and any proceeds resulting from any transfers of this property, which are
not otherwise distributable under the SIPA. 15 U.S.C. §78fff(c)(2)(B) (1970).
15 U.S.C. §78fff(c)(2)(C) (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. §78fff(f)(1) (1970). See SEC v. Guaranty Bond & Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d
145 (6th Cir. 1974).
" 15 U.S.C. §78fff(a)(4) (1970).
2* 15 U.S.C. §78eee(b)(2) (1970).
21 Courts have nevertheless exercised indirect control over SIPC trustees through
review of the awarding of attorneys' and trustees' fees. See text accompanying notes
55-62 infra.
15 U.S.C. §78fff(c)(1) (1970).
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no guidelines are provided to aid in the integration of the two statu-
tory schemes; and therefore, the courts have been dealing with the
question of integration on a case-by-case basis. In addition, numerous
interpretative difficulties have arisen with regard to application of
the SIPA. While courts have dealt with the problem of defining such
terms as "open contractual commitments" and "specifically identifi-
able property," no clear definitions have yet been formulated.
Litigation under the SIPA was not extensive in 1974, but a num-
ber of cases significantly clarified the operation of the Act. These
cases involved issues in three general areas: (1) qualification as a
"customer" for coverage under the Act, (2) protection of customers'
claims, and (3) compensation of attorneys and trustees in SIPC liqui-
dations. As in all securities litigation, the courts decided these issues
by examining the intent and purpose of the relevant legislation.
A. "Customers" under the SIPA
To qualify as a "customer" and become entitled to the satisfac-
tion of claims arising from the failure of a broker-dealer, 2 a person
must have entrusted his securities to the debtor.2 The Second Circuit
in SEC v. F.O. Baroff Co.,26 recently stated that entrusting securities
to the debtor entails more than mere physical delivery; the securities
must have been delivered to the debtor for investment or trading
purposes. In Baroff, the appellant Lubin had delivered 7,000 shares
of stock to F.O. Baroff Co. to be used as collateral for loans which
Baroff had secured from third parties. 7 This transaction placed
Lubin literally within the SIPA §6(c)(2)(A)(ii) which defines "cus-
" The term "customer" is defined in general terms in the statute. 15 U.S.C.
§78fff(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1970).
24 See text accompanying note 32 infra.
= 15 U.S.C. §78fff(c) (2) (A) (ii) (1970). See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, Andrews & Bradley,
Inc., 385 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., 378 F. Supp.
697 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Courts have required that the securities be physically delivered
to the debtor sometime prior to the SIPC liquidation proceeding.
In Kenneth Bove & Co., the plaintiffs had agreed to deliver stock to the debtor
but had never made the delivery and were therefore not considered customers within
the meaning of the SIPA. The plaintiffs argued, however, that since the debtor had
instructed them to deliver the securities to another broker-dealer, there had been a
"constructive delivery" to the debtor. The court rejected this contention by requiring
actual possession by the debtor. Id. at 700.
497 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1974).
21 There was no evidence in the record of Lubin's motive, but a letter from Lubin's
attorney indicated that the securities loan was to assist Baroff in getting out of a cash
bind. Id. at 281.
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tomer" as a person with "claims on account of securities received,
acquired or held by the debtor from or for the account of such persons
* . . (VI) by way of loans of securities by such persons to the debtor
.... "2 However, the Second Circuit stated that this fact was not
dispositive of whether the claimant in the proceeding was a customer
under the SIPA.
After reviewing the legislative history, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the provisions of the Act should not be applied literally.
The court noted that the SIPA was intended to protect investors"9 and
stated "that the 1970 Act was not designed to protect a lender in
appellant's class."3" Thus, the Second Circuit held that to qualify as
a "customer" and become entitled to the protection of the SIPA, a
person must have entrusted his securities to the actual possession of
the debtor with the intention that they be used for investment or
trading purposes. "
B. Claims of Customers
The SIPA provides four methods by which customers' claims may
be satisfied: (1) by the completion of "open contractual commit-
ments;" (2) by the return of "specifically identifiable property" pos-
sessed by the debtor; (3) by the distribution of the "single and sepa-
rate fund," which consists of all property possessed by the debtor
which is not specifically identifiable to the customers; and (4) by
advancing funds from the SIPC. 31
When faced with financial ruin in the period between 1967 and
1970, many brokers misappropriated customers' securities and
squandered free credit balances to keep their businesses afloat.33 In
administering the SIPA, trustees and courts were faced with two
considerations: use of the Act to regulate practices among customers
and broker-dealers thus preventing a recurrence of the prior fraudu-
15 U.S.C. §78fff(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1970).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1613, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5254, 5255 (1970).
1 497 F.2d at 282. The court considered Lubin's position the same as that of a
"commercial bank, trade creditor, landlord, equipment lessor, or any other party who
relies on the ability of a business enterprise to repay a business loan." Id. at 284.
1' The definition of a customer in §6(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the SIPA, however, is still
applicable to the extent that no other definitional provision of "customer" are found
in the Act. Section 6(d) of the Act contains a separate definition of a customer applica-
ble only to that section. See SEC v. Kelly, Andrews & Bradley, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 948
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
11 See SEC v. S.J. Salmon & Co., 375 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); notes 16-18
supra.
11 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1613, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5254, 5255 (1970).
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lent activities, and implementation to provide a limited insurance
measure promoting financial stability in the securities industry. In
light of these considerations, courts have concluded that the SIPA
was not intended to protect those customers who themselves engaged
in fraudulent activity, and those courts have thus developed the "in-
nocent investors" doctrine.Y This doctrine is premised upon the ra-
tionale that: "To allow [a customer] to obtain reimbursement from
[the SIPC fund] for a transaction which was part and parcel of his
manipulative and fraudulent activities. . . would be a gross perver-
sion of a statute intended to protect the victims, not benefit the
perpetrators, of such frauds.""
However, difficulties may arise in applying the innocent investors
doctrine to the SIPA provision which authorizes the SIPC trustee to
complete all open contractual commitments, in which a customer has
an interest, between the debtor and other broker-dealers." This pro-
vision of the Act was intended not only to protect customers, but also
to prevent the "domino effect" which may occur when one broker-
dealer's financial failure causes the failure of other broker-dealers
with which the debtor has open contractual commitments." Thus, a
potential conflict may exist between the purpose of the innocent
investors doctrine and the rationale for completing open contractual
commitments. Whereas the innocent investors doctrine would pre-
clude recovery because of a fraudulent activity by the claiming cus-
tomer, prevention of the domino effect would mandate recovery even
under such circumstances.
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Packer, Wilbur & Co.,"8 was re-
cently forced to reconcile these conflicting purposes. That case in-
volved a broker-dealer which traded securities with a debtor on behalf
of an investor, Arenstein. Arenstein purchased 2,000 shares of Syntex
common stock through his broker Coggeshall for a total price of
$90,933.82. Shortly thereafter Arenstein instructed Packer, Wilbur &
Co., his other broker, to sell the same number of Syntex shares for a
price of $94,203.10. At Arenstein's direction Coggeshall delivered the
recently purchased shares to Packer, Wilbur in exchange for two
3 In SEC v. Kelley, Andrews & Bradley, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
the court applied the innocent investors doctrine to deny a claim when the claimant
had engaged in a conspiracy to manipulate the price of a particular stock, enabling
him to sell to the public at inflated prices.
Id. at 955.
15 U.S.C. §78fff(d) (1970). See SEC v. North Am. Planning Corp., CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,957 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1975).
n H.R. REP. No. 91-1613, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5254, 5263 (1970).
- 498 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1974).
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faulty checks. Packer, Wilbur failed, and both Coggeshall and Aren-
stein lodged separate claims in the ensuing liquidation. Arenstein
argued that since he conducted his transaction with Packer, Wilbur
through an agent Coggeshall,39 he was a "customer" of the bankrupt
broker under the Act. The district court" denied both Arenstein's and
Coggeshall's claims on the basis that Arenstein was not an innocent
investor,4 and because Coggeshall had contributed to the violation.2
To recover on the two faulty checks, Coggeshall appealed the district
court's decision contending that Packer, Wilbur had an open contrac-
tual commitment to Coggeshall which the trustee was obligated to
complete.
Although the Second Circuit found that Arenstein had engaged in
a fraudulent practice known as "free-riding, 4 3 it indicated that Cog-
geshall had not committed any violations and had acted in good
faith. The court, however, affirmed the district court's decision on
two independent bases. First, the court reasoned that "[i]f Aren-
stein is to be denied the protection of the SIPC in his own right
because of his misdeeds, it would hardly serve the cause of statutory
consistency to allow Coggeshall to recover on his behalf under another
section."" Emphasizing that recovery on the basis of an open con-
tractual commitment requires that a customer have an interest in the
transaction, the Second Circuit concluded that since Arenstein had
been denied status as a customer because of his fraudulent activity,
Coggeshall could no longer claim to have acted on behalf of a cus-
tomer. Thus, the innocent investors doctrine, as applied to Arenstein,
indirectly denied relief to Coggeshall.45
" See note 31 supra.
40 362 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
4, See text accompanying note 34 supra.
"' The district court found that Coggeshall had also violated Regulation T, see
note 42 infra, since it assisted Arenstein in the transaction with constructive notice of
Arenstein's violation. 362 F. Supp. at 516.
0 "Free-riding" involves buying securities through one broker-dealer at a low
price, then selling the same securities through another broker at a higher price using
the proceeds to pay for the initial purchase and retaining the difference as profit. 498
F.2d at 981. Such a practice violates "Regulation T," 12 C.F.R. §220.4(c)(1)(i) (1974).
11 498 F.2d at 984.
41 The decision by the Second Circuit closely follows the statutory language of the
open contractual commitment provision of the SIPA, and therefore, the provision itself
presents the problem of competing purposes considered by the court. See text accom-
panying notes 36-37 supra. Although application of the innocent investors doctrine
rightly precluded Arenstein from recovery, it indirectly forced Coggeshall to seek other
tenuous remedies which required extended litigation. See note 48 infra. The $100,000
loss suffered by Coggeshall placed the broker in a precarious position which might have
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Although the innocent investors doctrine serves a useful purpose
when the customer has dealt directly with the debtor," as applied in
this case the doctrine apparently nullifies the primary purpose of the
open contractual commitment provision, which is to prevent finan-
cial havoc in the securities industry due to the failure of one broker-
dealer.47 Arguably, the result of the Second Circuit's decision pre-
sented just that potential for financial distress which the SIPA was
partially designed to prevent. 8 As an alternative basis for its decision,
however, the court suggested that no open contractual commitment
existed between Packer, Wilbur & Co. and Coggeshall. The Second
Circuit stated that Coggeshall's claim could be dismissed because the
legislative history of the open contractual commitment provision in-
dicated an intention to encompass only wholly executory contracts.49
In expressly recognizing an alternative ground for its decision, the
court implied that application of the innocent investors doctrine
might not be entirely appropriate in every case.
During 1974, courts also considered claims under other SIPA pro-
visions, and attempted to clarify further the phrase "specifically
identifiable property," which is one source from which SIPA claims
may be satisfied. Various courts held that for claims to qualify under
resulted in a "domino effect." See note 37 supra and accompanying text. However,
such a situation would have been avoided if the Second Circuit had restricted applica-
tion of the innocent investors doctrine to situations in which the customer claims direct
reimbursement from the debtor rather than through another broker-dealer. This differ-
entiation can be made since the open contractual commitment provision of the SIPA
provides its own definition of a "customer," which is less detailed than the general
definition in §6(c)(2)(A)(ii). See note 31 supra.
" The customer can be found to have acquiesced in a fraudulent practice by the
debtor in a purchase of shares, if the customer's experience in securities should have
made him aware of the fraudulent nature of the practice. After such a finding, the
innocent investors doctrine would prevent the customer from claiming relief. See SEC
v. North Am. Planning Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,957 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24,
1975).
"See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
Coggeshall sustained a loss of $90,933.82 in the purchase of the 2,000 Syntex
shares. Since the checks from Packer, Wilbur were faulty, Coggeshall's only alterna-
tives were a civil suit against Arenstein, or the tenuous procedure of claiming-as a
customer in its own right-payment out of the single and separate fund from Packer,
Wilbur. See Note, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 136, 145-46 n.69 (1974).
" 498 F.2d at 985. The court concluded that allowing the completion of partially
executed contracts would subject the trustee to "unlimited obligations." One commen-
tator has suggested that the Second Circuit has misinterpreted §6(d), stating that the
history of the Act does not substantiate the court's conclusion. See Note, 43 FoRDHAM
L. Rav. 136, 149 (1974). But see Rule 56d-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.206d-1 (1974). The Rule
was amended in 1974 by Release No. SIPA-5A, 39 Fed. Reg. 15402 (May 3, 1974).
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this provision the investments held by the broker must be directly
identifiable as belonging to the customer." Futhermore, the invest-
ments must be separated from the other assets of the broker by being
clearly marked and placed in the investors' own accounts." All in-
vestments which cannot be thus identified are placed in a "single and
separate fund," which is then distributed pro rata to the customers
of the debtor.
52
C. Attorneys and Trustees in SIPC Liquidations
Although little litigation has occurred in this area, 1974 decisions
have reaffirmed two points: (1) the SIPA must be read in conjunction
with Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 3 and (2) the courts retain
11 In Seidman v. Weis Sec., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,757 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
8, 1974), the plaintiff maintained a margin account with Weis including 5,500 shares
of American Home Products (AHP) stock and -a debit balance of $350,000. AHP an-
nounced a three-for-one stock split, with delivery of the additional shares to be made
at a future date. Weis threatened to sell plaintiff's shares to cover the debit balance
unless plaintiff transferred his account to another broker. Merrill Lynch purchased the
account and received a due-bill for the additional 11,000 shares resulting from the stock
split. This due-bill was never delivered by Merrill Lynch to Weis for the purpose of
receiving the additional shares. Weis failed, and the plaintiff applied for the return of
the 11,000 shares as "specifically identifiable property " The court rejected this claim
by stating that because the due-bill was never delivered, "Weis never had anything
more than a credit for 11,000 shares of stock due Merrill on its books. In short Weis
never held shares particularly identifiable to plaintiff." Id. at 96,491-96,492.
See In re Weis Sec., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,979 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1975)
which held that bonds must be in the possession of the debtor at the time the SIPC
liquidation proceedings commence to be specifically identifiable property. Further-
more, the court stated that the uncashed check which the customer had received from
the debtor as payment for the bonds, was not specifically identifiable property since
the check did not represent a "free credit balance" as required by Rule 15c3-3(j), 17
C.F.R. §240.15c3(j) (1974). The rule states that cash can be considered specifically
identifiable property only with respect to those customers of the debtor who maintain
free credit balances.
51 See In re Weis Sec., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 94,780 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,
1974). The statutory guidelines for determining whether property is specifically identi-
fiable include the concept of "bulk segregation." 15 U.S.C. §78fff(c)(2) (C) (1970). One
court has stated that bulk segregation "pertains to securities which have been received
or acquired for the accounts of customers who have an immediate right to receive such
securities from the broker." SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co., 378 F. Supp. 906, 910
(E.D. Pa. 1974). In Albert & Maguire, the customers had not paid the full purchase
price of the securities, and the debtor, which had partially paid the purchase price,
retained control over the securities and could pledge them on any debt it owed. Id. The
court concluded that the securities did not come within the definition of bulk segrega-
tion.
52 15 U.S.C. §78fff(c)(2)(B) (1970).
- 11 U.S.C. §§501 et seq. (1970).
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ultimate discretion over the awarding of attorneys' fees.
In SEC v. Aberdeen Securities Co.," the Delaware District Court
concluded that the attorney for a SIPC liquidation proceeding could
be paid fees from the debtor's estate only if his services were" 'benefi-
cial in the administration of the estate.' -15 In that case, one of the
claimants, Raizes, was represented by counsel, Bogutz. Although
Raizes' claim was originally denied by the trustee, Bogutz secured a
remand of the claims on appeal. After reconsideration, the trustee
reinstated some of the previously rejected claims and sustained rejec-
tion of others. The court concluded that the attorney's services re-
sulted in a beneficial administration of the debtor's estate as to those
claims which were recovered, since without the attorney's efforts on
appeal those claims would have been denied. Therefore, the court
permitted the attorney to recover the expenses incurred from efforts
connected solely with the appeals which resulted in favorable reconsi-
derations. Thus, the case apparently held that only expenses incurred
by an attorney in efforts which favorably affect the outcome of a SIPC
proceeding can be recovered.
In SIPC v. Charisma Securities Corp.," the Second Circuit dem-
onstrated that the judiciary intends to retain ultimate discretion con-
cerning the awarding of attorneys' and trustees' fees. That case also
considered the applicability to the SIPA of §24111 of Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act, which states that the judge shall allow "reason-
able compensation for services rendered.""8 The SIPC maintained
that this section did not apply to so-called "no-asset" cases, in which
the SIPC pays the fee. 9 The SIPC contended that the purpose of
judicial scrutiny under §241 is twofold-"the protection of creditors
and the reorganized corporation from the award of excessive fees, and
the prevention of the abuse of the judicial system that award of such
fees would imply.""0 Since no creditors are affected by the award of
attorney's fees in no-asset cases, the SIPC maintained that only the
second consideration applied. The SIPC thus argued that "the dis-
trict courts should not disapprove SIPC-recommended fee awards in
'no-asset' cases unless they are so excessive and outrageous that the
" 381 F. Supp. 614 (D. Del. 1974).
381 F. Supp. at 617 citing 11 U.S.C. §643 (1970).
" 506 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1974).
11 U.S.C. §641 (1970).
11 U.S.C. §641 (1970).
5, Where there are assets in a liquidated corporation, the attorney's fees will nor-
mally be paid out of the estate; however, where there are no assets, these fees will be
paid from the SIPC fund. 506 F.2d at 1194.
6 Id.
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integrity of the judicial system is at stake."'" Realizing that such a
decision would result in higher fees in no-asset cases than in liquida-
tion proceedings which involve substantial assets, the Second Circuit
concluded that §241 was equally applicable to SIPA no-asset liquida-
tions.
D. Conclusion
The SIPA has been in effect for almost five years, yet litigation
involving the Act has been sparse. Thus, many difficulties still exist
with regard to application of the Act's provisions, and further judicial
interpretation will be required before many of these problems are
resolved. However, numerous trends can be discerned which should
provide guidance for the future.
Courts have continued to effectuate the policy underlying the
securities acts, holding that the remedial provisions of the SIPA
apply only to investors, and not to persons engaged in purely com-
mercial transactions with the debtor. Development of the innocent
investors doctrine has prevented use of the SIPA as a per se insurance
measure, and has provided an opportunity for judicial supervision of
the securities industry." Furthermore, flexibility in the SIPA permits
greater judicial control over SIPC proceedings through integration of
the numerous provisions of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and the
61 Id.
62 To insure maximum effectuation of this regulatory policy, one court recently
permitted private parties to compel action under the SIPA. In SEC v. Guaranty Bond
& Sec. Corp., 496 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1974), the court held that since the customers of
a broker-dealer had a definite interest in the application of the SIPA, the receiver, as
their representative had standing to compel action under the Act. The United States
Supreme Court, however, on review of the case, declared "that the overall structure
and purpose of the SIPC scheme are incompatible with such an implied right" of
private action, and therefore reversed the Sixth Circuit decision. See SIPC v. Barbour,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,093, at 97,873 (May 19, 1975). In a footnote, the Court
summarized an SEC suggestion, that the SEC decision not to proceed against the SIPC
may be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, without expressing an
opinion thereon. See generally Sowards & Mofsky, The Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970, 26 Bus. LAw 1271 (1971); SIPA" Assessment, supra note 7; Note, The
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in Investor Protection,
24 VAND. L. REv. 586 (1971).
On October 8, 1974, the SEC issued SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
11042, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,974, announcing the adoption of Rule 15b5-1 under
the Exchange Act, and corresponding amendments to Rule 15b6-1 and related Form
BDW. The new rule provides that, although a broker-dealer's registration is cancelled
by the SEC, its registration as a member firm under the SIPA is extended for a six-
month period after that cancellation by the SEC.
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SIIPA. Courts will continue to coordinate the two acts, thereby re-
stricting the discretion of the SIPC trustee, and concurrently increas-
ing the judicial discretion in SIPA proceedings.
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